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For a criminologist of his stature and reputation, David
Matza has published remarkably little. His criminological work
consists of two books and three articles, and he has contributed
two short pieces on "disreputable poverty." It is perhaps even
more remarkable that these few publications have achieved such
notoriety. Matza's work on delinquency, part of which was pro-
duced in collaboration with Gresham Sykes, have enjoyed a great
deal of celebrity owing to its controversial break with the long-
standing theme of subcultural delinquency. His later book, Be-
coming Deviant (1969), has been viewed by some as a sort of
landmark in the development of the field.
This paper reviews Matza's contributions to the sociology
of deviance and attempts to identify basic themes which are
constant throughout his work. Part I deals with his metatheoret-
ical stance, naturalism. Parts II and III briefly summarize his work
on juvenile delinquency and the existential theory of deviance
contained in Becoming Deviant. Those already familiar with
Matza's sociology may find these synopses superficial, but my
- purpose is- to .illustrate recurrent issues rather than to - explain'- -
his ideas in detail. Finally, Part IV presents a summary and con-
clusion.
"NATURALISM"
In his influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions (1970:10), Thomas Kuhn defined paradigms as scientific
*1 thank William Arnold for his critical comments on an earlier verison of
this paper.
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achievements which serve for a time to define the legitimate
problems and methods of a research field for succeeding genera-
tions of practitioners. Clearly, sociology does not exhibit the
paradigmatic unity of other sciences and, consequently, the'
application of Kuhn's concept to the discipline is made some-.
what problematic (see Ritzer, 1975). Thus, I am undoubtedly-
stretching the term beyond its original limits in applying it to
Matza's naturalism. Nevertheless, much of Matza's work is aimed
at explicating this perspective so as to provide new directions
for criminology and the sociology of deviance and new conceptual
"boxes" for analysis. As such, naturalism seems a logical place to
begin.
Matza begins Delinquency and Drift (1964) with a call for
the reordering of standards of theoretical adequacy; theory should
be valued not for its quantifiability, its scientific precision or its
technical utility, but rather for the plausibility of its imagery.
A system, whether it be capitalism or delinquency, has exemp-
lars, basic figures who perpetuate the system. The accurate
characterizing of exemplars is a crucial step in the develop-
ment of explanatory theory. Given the present state of knowl-
edge, pictures are not true or false, but rather plausible or implaus-
ible .... Currently, therefore, the test of a picture is its ring of
truth (1964:1-2).
In Delinquency and Drift, Matza's theoretical approac~was
spelled out primarily in his critique of "hard determinism." In
.0 0 _ ' its _quest,{oI_scientific ~~~t\l~, he argues, positive criminology ~~l~
compelled to reduce the human being to an object, to treat
his/her behavior as wholly determined by circumstances beyond
his/her control. This is much more than a heuristic method,
however. Positive criminology did not merely choose to treat
humans as if they were objects in order to simplify the explana-
tory task, but rather so reduced humans in essence. This tendency
is even greater in criminology than in moder sociology as a whole
which, Matza. argues, has largely shed this position (1964:5).
In the place of "hard" determininism, Matza favors the
"soft" variety. Soft determinism involves "the maintaining of the,
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principle of universal causality as a guide to profound inquiry and
an abandoning of universal assumptions regarding the nature of
man, criminal or otherwise" (1964:7). The soft determinists
see both choice and constraint as elements of humanity: 1) each
individual is free in some contexts and determined in others;
2) some, due to personal qualities and/or social circumstances,
are freer than others. In a curious summary, Matza states that the
. · . fundamental assertion of soft determinism is that human
actions are not deprived of freedom because they are causally
determined. The compromise of soft determinism is not without
difficulties (1964: 9).
Indeed it is not! The hard determinist naturally asks: "if
choice itself is determined, is not choice illusory?" No, answers
Matza, because 1) humans, while not totally free, are unlike
objects of the physical order, and 2) the principle of universal
causality is itself under attack even in the physical sciences (1964:
9-10). We are on far safer grounds in accepting a more voluntar-
istic view.
In his argument there first appears a theme which reappears
in more sophisticated form in Becoming Deviant: The Loss of
Human Agency. It' is important to understand that Matza is not
pleading for a free-will psychology. Rather, he sees the need for a
sociology which recognizes what he takes to be the self-evidency
of volition and which accepts the tremendous complexity of
forces which impinge upon volition. The typical juvenile delin-
0" quent.ifor example, ..must be seen as "drifting" .into delinquency: .
Drift is motion guided gently by underlying forces. The guidance
is gentle and not constraining. The drift may be initiated or
deflected by events so numerous as to defy codification. But
underlying influences are operarive nonetheless in that they
make initiation to delinquency more probable, and they reduce
the chances that an event will deflect the drifter from his de-
linquent path (1964:29).
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Elsewhere, he reiterates:
To recognize and appreciate the meaning of being willing is by
no means to assert the existence of a free will. Indeed, it is the
very opposite. The logic of one's past, the human agencies in
one's situation are certainly real. They are the grounding for the
conduct of will. Free will, as the phrase itself implies, takes will
out of context, converting it into an abstraction of as little use
as any other will.. .is a sense of option that must be rendered
in context (1969:116).
Methodologically, the stance of naturalism requires first
and foremost that the analyst "remain true to the nature of the
phenomenon under study or scrutiny" (1969:5). In other words,
sociological observers are encouraged to shape their method of
approach entirely in terms of the nature of the subject; indeed,
Matza phrases this dictum in terms of "loyalty." We must be
loyal and committed, he says, not to any system of standards
(including the scientific method) but only to the reality which we
are studying. Thus, naturalism makes a clear break with positive
science: the scientific method should be used where it is appro-
priate; i.e., for the study of reactive objects. The nature of humans
as active subjects demands a different set of standards (1969:
3-5).
It is fairly obvious that there is a certain naivete in Matza's
statement of this methodological doctrine. As Laurie Taylor
(1970:289) correctly notes, the issue is not one of choosing to
remain true to the nature of the-phenomenon. or. choosing not to
do so. The issue, correctly stated, is 'what is the true nature of
the phenomenon under study?' In his enthusiasm for the philo-
sophy of naturalism, Matza implies that there are those who self-
consciously argue against remaining true to phenomena. I, for
one, have never encountered such a person. The source of the
demand for "remaining true" rests upon self-evidence; Matza
comes to believe that, once the mystifications of positive sci-
ence are stripped away, essential human nature becomes crystal
clear.
54
The Deviant Subject
It can~ot be ~enied that abstract models of complex phe-
nomena which are introduced as heuristic devices sometimes do
bec~me so ~n~re~ched as to cloud the vision of succeeding gen-
eranons. ThIS IS In the nature of paradigmatic clashes as described
by ~uhn: The disturbing thing about the early pages of Becoming
Deviant IS the author's "matter of fact" appeal to self-evid .hi · h ence,
t 15 IS t e weakest aspect of his defense of naturalism. However,
Taylo~ (1970:289-290) may be right in suggesting that no great
harm IS done through this. In later pages of the book Matza sue-~eeds in sp~~ing out ~ model of human nature which, if lacking
In the preCISI?n. and instrumental utility of positive science, at
least .matches It In terms of plausibility. I will leave the discussion
of this model for a later section of this paper.
. By encountering the notion of utility, our attention is
dIrecte~ ~o a final ~aj?r a~pect of the naturalistic perspective:
app.reclatlon". Matza IS m direct agreement with certain of the
sO~I~tal reactI~n theorists concerning the undesirability of doing
c~Inolo~ WIth one eye on the deviant subject and the other on
his correction. It is his position that the correctional focus is at
lea~t partly responsible for the mechanistic views which charac-
terized the cruder fo~ms of positive criminology.
The tr?uble WIth correctionalism, for Matza, lies not in a
mere :alu~-.Judgment. Rather, it lies with correctionalism's effect
upon InquIry. In forfeiting the capacity to empathize with deviant
actors, to put ourselves in their place, we also lose the capacity
to compre~end their acts. We lose the ability to grasp their per-
sonal meamngs .an.d are left ~ith a skeletal understanding (1969:
15~.~.~).. £ippr.ecla~tOn of deviance is a very difficult attitude. to.
mamtam, for obVIOUS reasons. Deviance troubles us, it violates our
?eeply-held values, it threatens the social reality in which we
mves~ '. Nevertheless, an appreciative stance is a necessary pre-
condition for any true understanding of deviant phenomena.
Matza does not conceive of himself as the originator of the
naturalistic perspective. Nor does he see himself as the first to do
c~imin?logy from a naturalistic perspective. Indeed, the first
eight-five pages of Becoming Deviant trace the development of
~atur~ism through the work of the Chicago school, the func-
tionalists, the neo-Chicagoans and others. I will not attempt
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to summarize this development, for such a task would require
far too much space. Suffice it to say that Matza recognizes an
extensive debt to past theorists who are often criticized harshly,
and perhaps unfairly, by many contemporary criminologists.
He sees in the development of American criminology a gradual and
admirable transition from correctionalism to appreciation (1969:
17-40), from an emphasis on pathology to a recognition of human
diversity (1969 :45-46), and from a simplistic dichotomy of con-
ventional and deviant worlds to a rudimentary understanding of .
their overlap (1969:70-85). In each case, the functionalists have
built upon the contributions of the Chicagoans, while the neo-
Chicagoans have corrected many of the errors and extended many
of the insights of the functionalists. Matza's task in writing Be- .
coming Deviant was twofold: first, to isolate the major themes of
a naturalistic approach to deviance and crime as they have been
revealed in past scholarship; and second, to provide the elements
of a naturalistic theory of deviance.
It might be charged that to collapse Matza's discussions
from two books, published five years apart, into a single pres~
entation is to oversimplify his basic theoretical assumptions.
People do change their minds and develop their ideas over time,
This is undoubtedly true and, in fact, it did happen in Matza's .. ',-.f,._,.rrr~c"'I1.1­
case; the discussion of the nature of the delinquent in Delin-
quency and Drift is relatively simplistic, whereas in .Becom~ng
Deviant it is more sophisticated and better grounded, m a philo-
sophical sense. But Matza's two books are not as different as they
may seem. The view of the human being which emerges from the
.preceeding ..page.s__jnvolves a recognition of the simultaneous
existence of external 'push' and internal choice. In other words,
humans are neither totally determined nor totally free; human
life and behavior involve a complex interplay between determina-
tion and will. Matza has noted that Becoming Deviant is based
upon a subjectivist approach which nevertheless recognizes that
there are "realities in the world" (Weis, 1971 :38). In fact, both.
books are based upon such an approach, but Delinquency and
Drift tends to focus more directly upon the impact of these,
external realities.
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THE THEORY OF NEUTRALIZATION AND DRIFT
Although the bulk of Matza's arguments concerning juvenile
delinquency may be found in his first book, Delinquency and
Drift, a fuller understanding requires the piecing together of
elements from a number of other works. The discussion which
follows draws upon several articles (Sykes and Matza, 1957;
Matza, 1961; Matza and Sykes, 1961) as well as the well-known
book.
The theory of neutralization and drift has its origin in an
explicit critique of subcultural theories of juvenile delinquency
as found, for example, in the work of Cohen (1955), Miller
(1958) and Cloward and Ohlin (1960). Each of these writers, in
his own way, posits the existence of delinquent subcultures with
their own set of values and standards of behavior. From this
general approach, juvenile delinquency is explained in terms of
the normative constraints manifested in the peer group. Matza
proposes that the imagery of an oppositional delinquent sub-
culture is erroneous, and presents evidence that delinquents are
rarely committed to an alternative set of values. Rather, delin-
quents tend to be firmly committed to neither the conventional
nor the delinquent world. They "drift" back and forth between
deviant and conventional action.
The crux of the argument derives from an apparent paradox:
if delinquents are not committed to an oppositional normative
system, how then are they able to escape the normative constraint
of the conventional culture? The solution, for Matza, is found in
. neutralization. .The delinquent is seen-as one-who is able to break
the moral bind by using a vocabulary of motives which justifies
particular delinquent acts without challenging the fundamental
legitimacy of the broader values which these acts contradict.
These "techniques of neutralization" include the denial of re-
sponsibility for wrongdoing, the denial that any real injury was
done, the denial of the legitimacy of the victim, the condemna-
tion of the delinquent's condemners, and the appeal to higher
loyalties (see Sykes and Matza, 1957). Each involves an extension
and distortion of defenses recognized in the Western legal tradi-
tion. Thus, the vocabulary of motives utilized by delinquents is
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drawn from the conventional world itself, not from an alter-
native system of values.
Matza sees this "overlap" as a central feature of youthful
deviance. The motivation for much delinquency is provided by
"subterranean values" of the conventional society, "values, that
is to say, which are in conflict or in competition with other
deeply held values but which are still recognized and accepted
by many" (Matza and Sykes, 1961). Exam~l~s include the~es
of excitement, leisure and aggressive masculinity as popularized
by the media. Moreover, there are "subterr~ean tr~ditions o.f
youth" which have long existed in American society-vquasi-
deviant adaptations to the peculiar status of adolescent. These
include delinquency, bohemianism, and radicalism'.All are p~bli­
cally denounced, all elicit a rather ambivalent societal reaction,
and all exist in both extreme and mild, "safe" versions. "Teenage
culture" itself is such a mild version of the subterranean tradi-
tion. it involves behaviors and beliefs which are based on the
same subterranean values as the more extreme traditions, but
it is not interpreted by most adults as a severe threat (Matza,
1961). ..
If delinquents are not truly committed to an mdepend:nt
set of values and guidelines, why do they appear so? Accordmg
to Matza the answer lies in the dynamics of the delinquent
group. The adolescent male is attracted to the.gang by an anxiety·.
over his masculinity, which is itself grounded m a mood of fatal-
ism. The typical gang delinquent is seen by Matza .as one W?O
feels unable to 'make things happen;' he feels determined, rnamp-
ulated .by forces ..beyond his control. The gang provides an op-
portunity to make dramatic things happen, an~ thereby to re-,
establish a sense of control. But in the situation of the peer
group, a system of collective misunderstan~ing develops.. Each
member comes to believe that his mates are m fact committed-:
more committed than he. To his masculinity anxiety is added a·
h "d· "new anxiety over his status in the group. T ~ consta~t ~o~n In~
and verbal jousting which characterizes the interacnon m Ju~enile
gangs contributes to this membership an~iety and re~ults. in an
ongoing bluff which is never called.. Outside of the sltua~lOn o~
company, the boy will express attitudes and values which ar
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often quite conventional, but in the group setting he must not
do so. Thus, the members of the gang are bound by the illusion
that there is an alternative normative framework to which the
others are committed and to which they must appear to be com-
mitted.
Admittedly, much has been omited from this brief synopsis
of Matza's theory of delinquency. Nevertheless, it should be
sufficient to illustrate several themes which are basic to the
naturalistic perspective and which reappear in his later work.
Matza's understanding of delinquency stresses the high degree
of overlap between the conventional and delinquent orders; the
delinquent phenomenon is not as deviant as it seems and , in a
sense, the conventional order is not as conventional as it makes
itself out to be. The delinquent is presented "not as a determined
object reacting blindly to external constraints. Rather, he is seen
as a human subject who varies in his ability to choose, but who
nevertheless adapts himself to the contingencies he perceives.
CRIME FROM THE INSIDE
Matza's second book and last criminological work, Becoming
Deviant (1969), represents a change of focus. Here, he transcends
his more narrow focus on juvenile delinquency in order to es-
tablish a broader naturalistic framework for the understanding of
crime in general. There is another change in focus, however,
which nevertheless preserves a link to his earlier concerns. As
mentioned previously, Matza's image of humanity is twofold;
it involves both agency (choice) and constraint. Humans are
subjects who make choices and thereby shape their world, but
which make these choices within broad circumstantial limitations.
The theory of delinquency emphasizes ways in which external
factors shape the behavior of juvenile delinquents by influencing
their self-consciousness. Becoming Deviant focuses more directly
upon the "inner" side of the process while continuing some of
the basic themes developed earlier, especially the loss of human
agency and the extensive overlap between conventional and
deviant enterprise. The book presents what is essentially a pheno-
menology of crime, a "map" of the process of being deviant from
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the internal perspective of the actor. It is a complex and difficult
work, not conducive to brief summarization.
Matza sees in the history of American criminology the
gradual development of three key concepts: affinity, referring to
attraction between objects; affiliation, referring to the uniting
of two objects which were previously unattached; and significa-
tion, or the feedback effect of societal reaction. All of these are
crucial to the process of becoming deviant, but the manner of
their use in criminology has been more appropriate for the physi-
cal than the human world. Matza's task is to humanize these
concepts and explain their "location" in the patterned series of
choices involved in deviation.
Far from merely reacting to their surroundings, human beings
adapt. Herein lies the human meaning of affinity. It must be
recognized, however, that human beings often lose their capacity
to make self-conscious choices. This loss of agency is termed
natural reduction, and calls to mind Matza's image of delinquents
who, through their contacts with the ideology of juvenile justice,
come to conceive of themselves as determined. Thus, "to be
applicable and useful in the study of man, the idea of affinity
must be revised in a manner that affirms subjective capacities
even while recognizing their diminution" (1969:92, emphasis
in the original).
Sociology's "favored affinity" has been that between poverty
and deviance. To Matza, this makes a certain sort of sense. Still,
the connection must be viewed not in terms of probabilistic
statistical generalizations but in terms of the concrete adaptations
of naturally reduced persons to dehumanizing surroundings. It
is only in the context of affiliation and signification that affinity
can come to have subjective meaning (1969:100).
In its earliest usage, affiliation came perilously close to
constituting a notion of contagion. It has been gradually recog-
nized, however, that this image does not fit the human world.
Far from "catching" a deviation or blindly stumbling into a
behavior pattern by reacting to new social surroundings, the
actor gradually, though not inevitably, affiliates with an alter-
native meaning system and the social group in which it is grounded
(see 1969:ch. 6). The less appropriate use of the concept was
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characteristic of the differential association and subcultural
traditions. As an exemplar of a more human concept of affilia-
tion, Matza cites Becker's work on marijuana use. In this piece,
Becker renders a "recipe" of marijuana use, a "faithful summary
of how to do what people have unwittingly been doing all along,"
though not necessarily in their commonsense terms (1969:110,
emphasis mine). Matza sees in this work a faithful description of
the subject's construction of the meaning of marijuana smoking
through ongoing interaction with more experienced others. It
allows the novice the choice, at each stage of the learning process,
of continuing or discontinuing. Through affiliation, the subject
engages in a continuous creation and re-ereaction of the meaning
of him/herself and of the deviant act. Such an existential project
of meaning-creation is central to all deviation. The product is an
individual gradually moving toward secondary deviation prior
to the impact of societal reaction.
Signification involves the experience of ban; i.e., the subject's
recognition of and adaptation to the fact that his/her activity is
prohibited and subject to sanction. As Weis pointed out in his
interview with Matza, the chapter on signification makes it clear
that Becoming Deviant might better have been entitled "Becom-
ing Criminal," since the author's focus is on the reaction to the
state (Weis, 1971).
Matza sees the societal reaction theorists' emphasis on
signification as praiseworthy, but criticizes them for neglecting
its connection to the ongoing relations between the deviant and
the authority of the state, and for failing to treat the deviant's
acceptance or rejection of the deviant label as problematic. 'rhe
importance of signification for Matza is twofold. Prior to appre-
hension, the experience of banned behavior forces secrecy and
guilt, and thus dictates that deviants elevate the prohibited
practice to a position of central importance in their lives. More-
over, the constant need for secrecy is relieved only in the company
of others like themselves. Thus, Matza agrees with Schur and
Becker in recognizing the importance of subcultural intervention
(1969 :154).
Signification per se begins with apprehension. Briefly stated,
it results in a redefinition of self and of the world, since the
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authority of the state causes the deviant to "lose the blissful
identity of one who among other things happens to have com-
mitted" a deviant act. Labeling theory has failed, according to
Matza, to address the question of why tagged deviants accept
or reject the labels which are applied to them. Many do not.
Ultimately, the issue comes down to the sort of reasoning engaged
in by the signified rule-breaker. If, as a result of the cues from
others, they interpret their isolation and punishment as an indica-
tion of an essence of themselves that they have not previously
understood rather than as a mere consequence of an act, the
label will be accepted and deviation will be' amplified.
If the agents of signification understood that the process
often 'backfires,' would they alter their activity? No, they prob-
ably would not, answers Matza. Herein lies his brief but
critique of the state. The "regular suspect" is an institution upon
which modern, rationalized social control rests. Without it, the _
formal effectiveness of criminal justice would be vastly reduced.
But the functions of the signification process must be viewed at
a higher level as well. The method of suspicion serves to create
a collective representation which provides the foundation not
only for institutionalized law enforcement, but for Leviathan
itself.
Never completely successful, and rarely without an initial but
weak basis in the facts of circumstance, the method of suspi-
cion provides substance for a Manichean vision of society: The
forces of evil are concentrated, their whereabouts are known
in principle; the task of law enforcement can proceed. And it
proceeds in approximately the same direction as when the police
were first instituted-toward the 'dangerous classes.' Within a
vision of concentrated evil, goodness may be conceived as per-
vasive. Given so striking a division, what recourse remains but to
convict persons who 'have been given every chance' but continue
amassing a record? Taking for granted the focused and instituted
scrutiny to which they are subjected, they are made to appear
strikingly different from the great majority who, as far as can be
ascertained, have never done anything wrong (1969:196).
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In its avid concern for public order and safety, implemented
through police force and penal policy, Leviathan is vindicated.
By pursuing evil and producing the appearance of good, the
state reveals its abiding method-the perpetuation of its good
name in the face of its own propensities for violence, conquest,
and destruction. Guarded by a collective representation in
which theft and violence reside in a dangerous class, morally
elevated by its correctional quest, the state achieves the legiti-
macy of pacific intention and 'the appearance of legality-even if
it goes to war and massively perpetrates activities it has allegedly
banned from the world. But that, the reader may say, is a dif-
ferent matter altogether. So says Leviathan-and that is the final
point of the collective representation (1969: 197, emphasis in the
original).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A number of themes remain constant through Matza's
criminological work, although they are presented in different
ways. The first and most important is a "soft" deterministic
view of human nature which makes a clean break from positive
science but which nevertheless leaves sufficient room for theoriz-
ing. The second, a derivative of the first which appears in its
developed form only in Becoming Deviant, is a transcendental
model of the human being. In this view, humans are capable of
going beyond their circumstances and participating in an existent-
ial project; this is as much an ontological argument as an empirical
one.
A third theme is directly liilked to the previous two. This is
Matza's tendency to focus upon factors which facilitate human
action rather than casual influences. In other words, Matza's
efforts have been directed largely toward specifying contingencies
which make deviance possible, given the necessary intentions;
e.g., techniques of neutralization. With the exception of his brief
discussion of the mood of fatalism and the naturalistic conception
of affinity, he has avoided any attempt to explain intention itself.
Predictably, this has left him open to criticism:
63
Mid-American Review of Sociology
Matza suggests that the 'mundane delinquent is the exemplary
delinquent in that he personifies, more fully than the compulsive
or the committed, the delinquent actor. But if this is true, Matza
is not offering us a general theory of delinquency but a descrip-
tion of the conditions that make mundane delinquency poss-
ible .... [He offers merely] a restrictive description of a situa-
tion which requires explanation in terms of the highly varied
reasons for which people move from occasional to frequent
delinquency (Taylor, Walton and YOWlg, 1973:181).
Matza provides a plausible if unprovable answer to those theorists
who see deviance as an inevitable process. However, this pheno-
menological ghost has not substance: the deviant has no ma-
terial basis. We are not given any account as to why individuals
should fmd affiliation to deviation attractive. Matza's pheno-
menology, like that of the ethnomethodologists, avoids the
question of etiology which it presumes to resolve (Taylor, Walton
and Young, 1973:191).
Fourth, Matza consistently focuses upon the direct inter-
play between conventional and deviant orders. Delinquent sub-
cultures are not oppositional; rather, their members drift back
and forth from deviant to conventional activities and do not
strongly oppose the basic values of middle-class society. The
techniques of neutralization which they use to break the moral
bind of the law are derived from some of the most basic insti-
tutions of society, albeit in a somewhat twisted form. The sub-
terranean traditions of youth, one of which provides the back-
ground for delinquent activity, are subtly integrated into the flow
of history and exist alongside more accepted forms. Morevoer,
the entire perspective of Becoming Deviant is based upon an
opposition to any clear dichotomy between convention and
deviance.
Matza's criminological work is not without its problems,
as he himself has recognized (Weis, 1971). These problems begin,
perhaps, with the philosophy of naturalism. Certain elements of
this theoretical system impress, others disappoint. I concur with
Taylor, Walton and Young (1973:173-174) in their view that
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Matza's theoretical strategy threatens to lead us into a situation
in which we can only accept as valid the accounts of deviant
subjects themselves. In other words, if we were to confine our-
selves to the letter of naturalism, we could only look at deviance
from the inside and we could not consider the etiological effects
of factors which subjects themselves are unable or unwilling to
see. On the other hand, Matza's paradigm can be of considerable
use so long as it is recognized that it represents only a part of
the picture. It may very well be that external contingencies will
relate to behavior only as they are mediated by actors, but this
does not necessarily mean that they will accurately comprehend
their situation or understand the process in which they are en-
gaged. Even Matza sees that deviants may exhibit 'false con-
ciousness' as, for example, when they experience the loss of
agency through natural reduction.
It may also be that Matza overextends his appreciative
stance. Although his attack upon overt correctionalism in crim-
inology is quite defensible, it does indeed tend toward an ex-
treme form of moral relativism. Still, there may be no real solu-
tion to this dilemma aside from the old dictum of making one's
value-orientation explicit rather than hiding it in the terms of
analysis. Matza seems able to do this in some of his work. One
of his papers on "disreputable poverty" (1966) makes no preten-
tions of value-freedom; poverty is approached as a miserable
and dehumanizing condition and, regardless of any virtues and
cultural achievements which flow out of slum life, one which
we ought to be rid of! This is made abundantly clear by his
counter-attack upon a critic of his work, which is hardly phrased
in relativistic terms:
Wishing ardently to avoid giving offense to the poor he falls
heir to a charming infantilism. For him, despite the oppression
of historic circumstance-for which we are to hold the 'non-
poor' responsible-the organization of social life among the
poor remains largely undaunted and intact. Far from seeing
the poor as stupefied or disorganized until they have mobilized
and achieved consciousness-the classic view of writers since
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Marx-Valentine follows the romantic tradition in which the
poor are merely different in their customs and arrangements
(Matza, 1969b).
Delinquency and Drift may be criticized for an overly con-
sensual view of society, although Matza seems hard to pin down
on this point. His recognition of overlap, which is quite valuable,
at times leads him to view culture as integrated across most all
social groups and classes even if it tends to be self-contradictory
at certain points (e.g., subterranean values). This, of course, relates
to a much larger and older sociological debate which has never
been settled to everyone's satisfaction. On the other hand, his
unwillingness to admit the possibility of a truly oppositional
subcultural system among juveniles may have lost its "ring of
truth." The gang members of the South Bronx, for example,
seem to be a good deal more self-conscious in their 'critique'
of conventional morality than Matza's delinquents of the 1950s.
Thus, it seems to be quite possible that the drifting delinquent
may have been an historical artifact rather than a general pheno-
menon.
The most serious shortcoming of Becoming Deviant is that
Matza's phenomenology avoids serious examination of larger
etiological issues (for an examination of this problem in pheno-
menology and ethnomethodology, see McNall and Johnson,
1975). We need the sort of criminology which attempts to locate
significant sources of deviance in the dominant culture and in the
social structure and which, consequently, takes overlap into
account. Matza, in his .attempt to explain deviance existentially,
directs attention to larger social factors only in his discussion of
Leviathan's role in signification. This is somewhat curious in view
of the following comment: "My second book, especially in the
final part, is a critique of the state" (Weis, 1971 :42). I, for one,
do not believe that it came out that way. Matza deals with the
state only as a phenomenological entity, not as an objective
force which impinges upon people's lives in ways which they may
not comprehend.
Still another problem with the perspective presented in
. Becoming Deviant is that it is difficult to test, to say the least.
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This is not sufficient cause to write it off as bad theory. Still,
one need not yearn for a completely rationalistic, non-empirical
sociology to see that no theory can have great value in sociology
unless it can be verified in the real world.
The problem with Matza's approach may be more of an
inconvenience, however; we simply do not have the tools with
which to test it precisely. Becoming Deviant is a dialectical work,
and dialectical works are extremely difficult or impossible to deal
with in terms of mainstream sociological methodology. Even the
theory of neutralization has not as yet been supported or clearly
refuted by empirical research (see Gordon et al., 1963; Siegel
et al., 1973; Hindelang, 1972,1974; Verlade, 1978). It may well
be that it is one pattern among many. Becoming Deviant has met
a similar fate. It has stimulated little empirical research due to the
difficulty of operationalization. Moreover, it is rather difficult
to tell where it leads us theoretically (Manning, 1972). Should an
existential school of criminological thought arise, it undoubtedly
will refer back to Becoming Deviant as its manifesto.
The direction which Matza seemed to be taking as of 1971
was toward the sort of position which might have dealt with
some of the problems noted above. Becoming Deviant was written
in part while in London, in the company of critical British crim-
inologists such as David Downes and Stanley Cohen. Their emer-
gent thought seems not to have had an observable influence on
the book, but may have led him to change his mind later. As the
following remarks show, he seemed to be moving toward a per-
spective which is much more consistent with his admiring critics,
the radical criminologists.
I think the interest in interpretive or phenomenological sociology
is a half-way house. In terms of my own personal development
and of a lot of people I know, we've had to get out from under
positive or bourgeois sociology. Phenomenology is what we had
to go through, but only I think to get to the next stage: critical
or Marxist sociology.... The interest in Dilthey and Husser!
will gradually wane. A lot of us, I think, will move toward a more
self-consciously Marxist interpretive I sociology. I know that's
what I'm doing... (Weis,1971 :44).
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In terms of criminology, we will apparently never know what
the "late-late" Matza would look like; he has decided to return to
his earlier concerns with poverty and labor. As late as 1978, he
considered a revision of Becoming Deviant for a second edition.
Ultimately, the publisher decided that it was not the sort of book
which really needed revising, and the project was abandoned. Too.
bad, because it would have been very interesting to see where
Matza would have taken us.
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